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Abstract 
In past decades, a number of developing countries experienced a rapid growth in their exports 
of highly perishable horticultural products to developed high-income countries. One example 
is the export of flowers from African countries to Europe. However, the development of the 
flower industry is unbalanced: in the same region, some countries experience a prosperous 
export growth while others have a mediocre growth or even show a decline. This paper 
addresses the question of the impact of institutions on the variation in market performances 
among internationally oriented flower industries. As institutions play a major role in enabling 
development, an interesting question is how the institutional environment supports the 
development of an internationally oriented flower industry. The empirical findings show a 
strong correlation between both the level and the growth of per capita GDP and institutions, in 
line with most empirical studies on the impact of institutions. Surprisingly, no relations 
between the growth of flower export and the same prevailing institutions are found. Reasons 
might be the special economic activity, the foreign input of knowledge and equipment and the 
negligible domestic market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In past decades, a number of developing countries experienced a rapid growth in their exports 
of highly perishable horticultural products to developed high-income countries. In general, 
this growth can be explained by comparative advantage. Batt (2000) concludes that ‘the basic 
factors of production are a great deal more important in the evolution than the literature would 
suggest’. Labor-intensive cut flowers are grown in low cost countries. Especially African 
countries have become very competitive for specific labor-intensive rose varieties and partly 
pushed European growers out of the market (Wijnands, 2005). In most developing countries a 
well-developed domestic flower market is absent, making production fully export oriented. 
Most African (South American) flower industries maintain a close link with the markets in 
Europe (the USA). The supporting and supplying firms fully rely on imports from developed 
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countries. The Netherlands and Israel are the main suppliers of flower varieties and advanced 
technologies. In addition, the Dutch flower auctions are the leading marketplace for African 
flowers (Wijnands, 2005). However, the development of the flower industry is unbalanced; in 
the same region one finds countries experiencing a prosperous export growth as well as 
countries that show a poor growth or even a decline. For example, in the period 1997/98 to 
2003/04 Ecuador showed a strong growth of its share on the world flower market, whereas 
neighboring Colombia showed a decline of its share. What might be the reason behind this 
differential development? 
 To our knowledge, there has been no research on the impact of formal institutions on 
the flower industry in developing countries. This paper explores the relationship between the 
economic performance of the flower industry in developing countries and the formal 
institutional environment. The main research question is whether the export performance of 
flower industries in developing countries depends on the quality of the institutional 
environment. First, we analyze the impact of institutions on overall economic growth for a 
selected group of flower exporting developing countries. Second, we deal with the question 
whether the same institutions have a comparable impact on the performance of the flower 
industries. 
 The structure of the papers is as follows. Section 2 addresses the interaction between 
the quality of the formal institutional environment and sector performance based on the theory 
of New Institutional Economics. Section 3 discusses the hypothesis, the measurements of the 
indicators as well as the data found. The results are presented in Section 4, followed by 
discussion (Section 5) and conclusion (Section 6). 
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
Institutions and economics 
New institutional economics analyses the role of institutions in economic development and 
growth. Institutions can be defined as the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions. They consist both of informal constraints, such as customs, 
traditions and common norms, and formal rules, such as laws and property rights (North, 
1991: 97). Another definition emphasizes the rules that are needed to facilitate the game of 
economic exchange: institutions are the rules of the game. “Formal rules include political (and 
judicial) rules, economic rules and contracts. The hierarchy of such rules, from constitutions, 
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to statute and common laws, to specific bylaws, and finally to individual contracts defines 
constraints, from general rules to particular specifications” (North, 1990: 47). The rules of the 
game are important for two reasons. First, well-understood rules establish baseline conditions 
for human interaction, and give certain predictability to what other parties will do in a 
particular context, that permits the actions of different individuals to be coordinated, and 
efficient transactional agreements achieved. Second, rules can serve to discourage or rule out 
actions that, if widely practiced, would be economically costly, and encourage actions which, 
if widely taken, can be productive for all (Nelson and Sampat, 2001: 33). 
 According to the classification of economic transformations from local village 
exchange to globalization (North, 1991; Shirley, 2005: 613) an export oriented flower 
industry can be considered as a last stage in economic development. All economic actors 
carry out very specialized functions and coordination among these activities is obtained 
within a sophisticated network of mutual relationships. Efficient exchanges between the 
various actors require a set of institutions and organizations to keep transaction costs low. 
“International specialization and division of labor requires institutions and organizations to 
safeguard property rights across international boundaries so that capital markets (as well as 
other kinds of exchange) can take place within credible commitment on the part of the 
players” (North, 1991: 101).  
 An important aim of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by providing a structure that 
guides human interaction (North, 1990: 3). Uncertainties arise from incomplete information 
with respect to the behavior of other individuals in the process of human interaction, from 
computational limitations of individuals, as well as from the difficulty of measuring all the 
attributes of a product. By constraining human action in situations of uncertainty, institutions 
limit the choice set of actors, support economizing on information costs, and thus increase 
predictability of actions. 
 Williamson (2000) has distinguished four levels of institutions (Table 1). In our 
analysis, we focus on the formal institutions at the level of the institutional environment. This 
is the level of the rules of the game, such as defining and protecting property rights, the 
political decision-making structure, and the judiciary system. As the flower industry in most 
developing countries is fully export oriented, formal institutions are more important than 
informal ones. As Dixit (2004) has argued, the relative importance of formal institutions 
increases as the scope of market exchange broadens and deepens. One reason is that setting up 
formal institutions requires high fixed costs but low marginal costs, whereas informal 
institutions have high marginal costs. 
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Table 1 Four levels of institutional analysis 
 Level Frequency Purpose Theory 
1 Embeddedness informal institution, 
customs, traditions, norms, religion 
100-1000 
years  
Often non-calculative; 
spontaneous 
Social theory 
2 Institutional environment: formal 
rules of the game esp. property 
(polity, judiciary, bureaucracy) 
10-100 
years 
Get the institutional 
environment right 
Economics of property 
rights, positive political 
economy 
3 Governance: play of the game – esp. 
contract (aligning governance 
structure with transactions) 
1-10 years Get the governance 
structure right 
Transaction costs 
economics 
4 Resource allocation and employment 
(prices and quantities; incentive 
alignment) 
Continuous Get the marginal 
condition right 
Neoclassical 
economics/agency 
theory 
Source: Williamson, 2000: 597 
 
Before (international) exchange can take place, the marginal conditions (level 4 in Table 1) 
for economic activities should be right. Given the continuous growth of the flower industries 
in many developing countries, we assume that the resource allocation and employment 
conditions meet the requirements. Moreover, the world demand for flowers is still increasing 
(Wijnands, 2005, p66). At level 3 we find the governance structures, which are efficient 
organizational solutions to the problems of transaction costs. For the flower industry, 
governance structure choice is directly linked to marketing channel choice (Van der Lans, 
2005). As producers target export markets they simultaneously have to decide on the 
governance structure and the market channel. It is a choice between the spot market of the 
Dutch auction or a contract with large retail companies.  
 
Growth strategies and institutions 
By the late 1980s, there was among economists and politicians a growing recognition that 
market liberalization and privatization may not be sufficient to ignite and sustain economic 
growth. Public policies promoting such structural adjustments (often summarized as the 
Washington Consensus) should be accompanied by policies that are more institutional in 
nature and targeted at the working not only of markets, but also of governments. The original 
list of policy recommendation was expanded to include items that range from anti-corruption 
and corporate governance to social safety nets and targeted anti-poverty programs. Still, even 
the augmented Washington list of key elements of a growth programmed does not necessarily 
explain economic growth. Numerous examples of countries, particularly in Asia, show 
significant and sustained growth without following the conventional recommendations of 
liberal markets and a restricted role for government (Rodrik, 2003). 
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Rodrik (2003) argues that first-order economic principles such as protection of 
property rights, market-based competition, appropriate incentives, and sound money, do not 
map into unique policy recommendation. As an alternative, he presents a list of market-
sustaining institutions that can be obtained by various institutional arrangements (Table 2). 
The starting point for these institutions is the recognition that markets need not be self-
creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing, and self-legitimizing. The very existence of market 
exchange presupposes property rights and some form of contract enforcement. Next, markets 
require regulation to minimize abuse of market power, internalize externalities, deal with 
information asymmetries, establish product and safety standards, and so on. In addition, 
monetary, fiscal and other arrangements are needed to deal with business cycles and the 
problems of unemployment and inflation. Finally, market outcomes need to be legitimized 
through social protection, social insurance, and democratic governance most broadly. 
Together these four types of institutions may sustain markets. We will use this taxonomy of 
institutions as a starting point for our analysis. 
 
Table 2 A taxonomy of market-sustaining institutions 
Property rights Market-creating institutions Contract enforcement 
Regulatory bodies Market-regulating institutions Other mechanisms for correcting market failures 
Monetary and fiscal institutions Market-stabilizing institutions Institutions of prudential regulation and supervision 
Democracy Market-legitimizing institutions Social protection and social insurance 
Source: Rodrik, 2003 
 
A number of other scholars have studied the relationship between economic development and 
institutions. The impact of the social infrastructure on the output per worker is the topic of the 
research of Hall and Jones (1990). Rodrik (1999) has found that domestic conflicts have 
negative effects on growth rates. Jütting (2003) and Shirley (2005) have reviewed several 
papers on the relationship between indicators of economic performance, such as growth, and 
incidence and quality of particular institutions. From these reviews, two issues are of main 
interest for our analysis: ‘How to measure institutions?’ and ‘What is the relationship between 
institutions and economic growth?’. 
 
How to measure institutions? 
Several indicators are used or constructed that are more or less related to the list of Rodrik 
(table 2). Hall and Jones (1990) use two indicators of social infrastructure: the Government 
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Anti-Diversion Policies (GADP) index and the openness of the economy. The GADP is based 
on the government’s role to protect property against private diversion, indicated by the 
variables (1) law and order and (2) bureaucratic quality, and on government’s possible role as 
a diverter based on the indicators (3) corruption, (4) risk of expropriation, and (5) government 
repudiation of contracts. The second indicator, the openness of the economy, is based on 
international trade indicators and government dominance in trade (socialist and export 
monopoly). Rodrik et al. (2004) measure institutions as perceptions of property rights and the 
rule of law. Sachs and Warner (1995) state that integration means not only increased market-
based trade and financial flows, but also institutional harmonization with regard to trade 
policy, legal code, tax systems, ownership patterns, and other regulatory arrangements. 
Rodrik (1999) constructs the quality of governmental institutions based on variables from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. Cross-country estimations are rather 
common (see e.g. Hall and Jones, 1990; Rodrik et al., 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2002; and 
Sachs, 2003). Shirley (2005: 626) critically comments on the variables that are used in cross-
country analyses: most variables do not measure institutions but outcomes of institutions (e.g., 
secure property rights is an outcome and not an institution). She pleads for more precisely 
defined variables. Despite her criticism, Shirley acknowledges the empirical evidence that 
institutions that increase political competition, civil liberties and promote cooperation 
contribute to an explanation of growth of per capita income.  
 
Is there causality between institutions and economic growth? 
What are the causal relations between economic growth and institutions? Hall and Jones 
(1990) discuss the causality. Openness of the economy is seen as an endogenous variable, 
perhaps depending on the output per worker. For instance, poor countries with limited ability 
to collect taxes may be forced to interfere with international trade. The growth of the 
Ethiopian flower sector has benefited from government support, such as tax exemptions, with 
the aim to earn foreign currency (MoFed, 2006). Rodrik et al. (2004) have emphasized that 
both determining the proper structural form of the equations and the endogeneity of variables 
result in many empirical caveats when seeking to explain economic growth. 
 
Research Approach 
A flower industry that aims at the high quality export market is recognized as an income 
generator for developing countries with abundant labor. Institutions are of major importance 
for these internationally organized chains. However, which institutions are appropriate, differs 
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between countries (Shirley 2005). Different institutions can host comparable outcomes. 
Jütting (2003) provides a useful definition of institutions. We will follow the framework of 
Jütting to analyze the impact of institution on sustained growth of the flower industry. The 
interaction between exogenous and endogenous variables as well as the impact of endogenous 
institutions and behavioral interaction determine outcomes of institutions. Figure 1 presents 
Jüttings framework 
Exogenous
Local setting
- Geography
- Exogenous Institutions
-Commodity
E
n
d
o
g
e
n
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u
s
Endogenous 
Institutions
Outcome of 
institutional
arrangements
• property rights 
enforcement
• social capital 
stock
• Political stability 
and corruption
Final outcome
• Growth
• Investment 
Area of interaction
Behavior of actors 
as result of exogenous
(dis)incentives
 
Figure 1 Framework for analyzing the impact of institutions on economic outcomes  
Source : Jütting 2003 
 
As institution are ‘humanly devised constraints’ to reduce uncertainty, the form will differ 
with the culture of a country. Behavior of actors complicate further measuring differences 
between countries. Cross-country comparison will be difficult or even impossible by using 
institutions and the behavior of actors as independent explanatory variables. In our approach, 
we aim at explaining the finale outcome (sustained growth) by the outcomes of institutions: 
the last stage in the approach of Jütting. Transparency in the outcomes is of major importance 
in global commodities chains. Gereffi et al. (2005) indicate complexity of information 
exchange and codification of transactions as important determinants in global commodity 
chains, such as the cut flower chain. Uncertainty in the outcome of institutions will 
complicate the governance structure of the chain. By using the outcomes of the institutions, 
endogeneity is not an issue. The disadvantage of this approach is that only relations between 
growth and institutions are shown. It does not give a causal relation, which means that we do 
not seek to explain growth by the quality level of the institutions. 
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3. Hypotheses, data and country selection 
 
Based on the review of the theoretical and empirical literature above we pose the following 
hypotheses: Sustained growth of real GDP per capita depends on the outcomes of institutions. 
Sustained growth in the share of the world export market of flowers depends on the outcome 
of the same institutions. 
 
Dependent variables 
Growth in flower exports 
The value added or production values are preferred as data for describing the growth of an 
economic sector. However, few statistics of the flower production value or even the 
production areas are available. FAO-statistics do not include flowers. The International 
Association of Horticultural Producers presents the data of a limited number of countries. 
Poor statistics in developing countries are the cause: the outcome of poor institutions. This is 
also the reason that export values are poorly recorded in the custom statistics. As most flowers 
are imported by high-income countries, the import values of all world countries originating 
from specific exporting countries are used as a proxy for export values. This indicator will be 
referred to as export by a country. The ITC/WTO trade database provides data from 1995 
until 2005. The developments of the time series are in line with expert opinions on the 
developments in the international trade of cut flowers. As dependent variable, the growth of 
the share on the world market of the values between 1995 and 2005 is used. By choosing 
growth of world market share, we eliminate the influence of fluctuations in prices and the 
overall growth in world exports. A positive performance is measured if the export of a 
country grows faster than the total world exports. 
 Countries are selected with at least 1 million USD flower export average in 1995 and 
1996 or in 2004 and 2005. The research is aiming at sustained growth and not at ignition of 
growth: therefore in both years should a registered level of flower exports. The threshold of 1 
million USD is meant to select countries that are in business and are relevant on the world 
market. This resulted in 49 countries with a share of over 99.75% in the total exports. The 
Dutch share is 57%. A second selection identifies the developing countries. Countries are 
selected as developing country with a GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD) below 10,000 
USD in each year. The data are retrieved form the World Development Indicators database 
(WDI). This resulted in 32 countries, with a total market share of 34% in 2004/2005. This 
market share is considerable higher than the 28% in 1995/1996. 
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Gross domestic product per capita 
Following studies by Sachs (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Aron (2000) the growth of GDP 
per capita in constant USD 2000 is used. The difference between GDP per capita in 1994 and 
2004 is taken as indicator for the overall growth of an economy. The data are from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Using the GDP per capita eliminates the effect of a 
country’s population size. This indicator might also be seen as proxy for labor cost. Flowers 
are labor intensive and lower labor costs should have a positive effect on export growth. 
 
Exogenous independent variables 
Distance  
The main consumption regions for cut flowers are Europe, USA and Japan. The distance of a 
country to consumption region determines the costs of logistics. E.g. the airfreight costs for 
flowers from Nairobi to Amsterdam amounts one third of the auction price (Wijnands, 2005: 
51). Statistics show that the majority of flowers from Africa has Europe as destination, from 
South America the USA and in Asian region Japan (Wijnands, 2005). The distance is 
measured in km from country’s capital to Amsterdam, Washington viz. Tokyo. The 
assumption is that the distance has a negative influence on the export growth. 
 
The Economic Freedom of the Word (EFW) index  
This index is an overall indicator for the outcomes of all institutional arrangements (Gwartney 
and Lawson, 2006). A positive influence on the growth is expected and a strong correlation 
with the partial indicators discussed below. The indicators below are a specification of this 
overall indicator. 
 
Independent variables: outcomes of institutional arrangements 
As independent variables, we use the outcome of market-sustaining institutions (Table 2). We 
will here discuss each variable and present the indicators used.  
 
Market-Creating Institutions 
a) Property rights 
• A sector specific indicator is the protection of new flower varieties. Flower rootstocks and 
seedlings are important assets for growers. Markets demands innovative colors and shapes 
of flowers. Market access to new flower varieties and protection of the property rights of 
breeders will be enabled by a membership of the International Union for the protection of 
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new varieties of plants (UPOV). The UPOV provides the date of membership and the date 
of being party of the act. Enforcement of this act is complying with property rights. The 
expected sign is that the years at January 1st 2006 of complying with the act will positively 
influence the export growth. 
• A general indicator is the ‘Protection of the intellectual property’ provided by the Fraser 
Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006). The level of the index indicates the quality of 
institutions and is assumed of having a positive influence on the export growth.  
• Corruption deals with the damage brought by bribes and means lower values of assets. 
Levels of corruption do not change sharply by short term actions. The 2000 Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) is taken from Transparency International (TI, 2006). The index 
ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) till 10 (highly clean). A higher index influences positively 
the export growth. 
b) Contract enforcement 
The efficiency of contract enforcement is indicated by following the evolution of a sale of 
goods dispute and tracking the time, cost, and number of procedures involved from the 
moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit until actual payment. The rank for 2005 from 
‘Doingbusiness’ is used: previous years are not available. Countries are ranked from best 
score starting with 1. The rank number will negatively influence the export growth. 
 
Market-Regulating Institutions 
a) Regulatory Bodies 
Spiller and Tommassi (2005. p538) emphasizes the understanding of institution of regulation 
‘as facilitating entering into complex intertemporal agreements of among policy-makers, 
agreements that have direct consequence for firms’ incentives and performance’. The 
variables chosen are from doing business 2005. A higher rank number will negatively 
influence the export growth. 
• Costs of starting a business. This topic identifies the bureaucratic and legal hurdles an 
entrepreneur must overcome to incorporate and register a new firm. It examines the 
procedures, time, and cost involved in launching a commercial or industrial firm with up 
to 50 employees. 
• Costs of obtaining licenses. This topic tracks the procedures, time, and costs to build a 
warehouse, including obtaining necessary licenses and permits, completing required 
notifications and inspections, and obtaining utility connections. 
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b) Mechanism to correct market failure 
Market failures deal with economic inefficiencies, even if the government does not block 
investments and entrepreneurship. 
• Rodrik (2003) indicates learning and human capital as a major indicator. The education 
index of the human development report is selected. The index is based on the adult 
literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary 
schools (HDR, 2006). It is expected that a higher rate has a positive influence on the 
export growth. People are then educated to do business in an international environment. 
• The market externalities are the second group in which openness of the economy is a 
selected indicator. The index for trading across borders from Doingbusiness is used. The 
index ‘looks at the procedural requirements for exporting and importing a standardized 
cargo of goods. Every official procedure is counted -- from the contractual agreement 
between the 2 parties to the delivery of goods -- along with the time necessary for 
completion’. A higher rank number will influence negatively the export growth. 
 
Market-stabilizing institutions 
a) Monetary and fiscal institutions 
As an outcome of the institutional arrangement, the inflation level has been used. This index 
GDP deflator from WDI is taken. The indicator is the average inflation level from 1995 to 
2003. Higher inflation decreases the export growth, thus a negative sign 
b) Institutions of prudential regulation and supervision 
The aim is to protect financial stability. As indicator is taken the indicator ‘Price Controls’ 
from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006). The level of the index indicates the 
quality of institutions and is assumed of having a positive influence of the level.  
 
Market-legitimizing institutions 
a) Democracy 
Democratic institutions and civil liberties can be seen as meta-institutions that help society to 
make appropriate selections out of economics institutions (Rodrik, 2003, p26). The index is 
based on Political rights and Civil Freedom. The data from 1999-2000, in middle of the 
performance measurement period, is taken from the annual survey of the Freedom House. The 
freedom index ranges from 1 (fully free) till 7 (not free), which means negatively correlated 
with the performance indicator. 
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b) Social protection 
The Fraser Institute provides an indicator based on an unemployment benefits system. The 
survey counts many missing values: 13 out of 32 are not available. The unemployment rate of 
the World Development Indicator (WDI) counts also many missing variable. More important 
is the bias. The WDI presents levels far below 20% for Zambia and Zimbabwe around the 
turn of the millennium whereas the CIA-fact book estimates 50 respectively 80% in 2006. For 
this reason, the estimates of the CIA fact book are taken. 
 
 Table 3 provides an overview of the data and the expected influence of the outcome of 
the institution on the export growth of flowers. Due to too many missing variables, Ethiopia 
and Yemen are excluded from the research, both countries with a strong export growth. The 
sample finally has 30 countries. Annex 1 shows the selected countries and the growth 
indicators. 
 
Table 3 Summary of variables and expected influence on independent variable. 
a) scale 1= low, 10 = high quality; b) Rank of countries: 1 is best performing 
Taxonomy  Variable Description Average Stdev Expected 
influence 
 Export 
growth 
Growth of the export market share of 
flowers between 1995 till 2005 (Also the 
average export 1995-2005 is provided) 
0.06 
 
 
0.14  
 GDP 
Growth 
Growth of Gross Domestic Production 
per capita in constant 2000 USD price 
(Also the average GDP 1994-2004 is 
provided) 
388 
 
 
463 (Negative for 
flower export) 
 km Distance from exporting to importing 
country (Only for flower exports) 
5506 2248 Negative 
 EFW Overall Economic Freedom Indicator a) 6.06 0.90 Positive 
UPOV Years of membership at 1/1/2006 of 
UPOV (only for flower exports) 
2.33 3.59 Positive 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights protection a) 3.79 1.11 Positive 
Property 
Rights 
CPI Corruption Perception index a) 3.52 1.19 Positive 
Contract 
enforcement 
CE Contract enforcement b) 100 38 Negative 
Start Starting a business B) 96 40 Negative Regulatory 
Bodies License Dealing with licenses b) 103 52 Negative 
Edu Education index. A higher index means 
higher education level 
0.77 0.12 Positive Market 
Failure 
Trade Trading across borders b) 98 43 Negative 
Fiscal 
institution 
Infl GDP deflator (inflation correction) 12.36 14.11 Negative 
Prudential 
regulations 
Price Price control a) 4.82 1.80 Positive 
Democracy Democ. The freedom index is used ranging from 1 
(fully free) till 7 (not free) 
3.72 1.50 Negative 
Social 
protection 
Unemp. Social exclusion, based on unemployment 
rate 
18.23 18.60 Negative 
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4. Results 
 
Table 4 shows the correlations between the dependent variable growth of the export market 
share of flowers and the growth of the GDP and the selected independent variables. Growth of 
the GDP is positively correlated with positive outcomes of institutions: all signs are in 
harmony with the expected signs. From the selected 11 variables 4 are significant at p <0.01 
level and 2 variables at p<0.05 level. The statistically significant and positive correlation of 
Corruption index and Democracy variable are in line with the conclusions of Shirley (2005, 
627). In addition, the variables openness of the economy (trade), education and regulatory 
bodies (starting a business) are positively and significantly related to the growth of the GDP 
per capita. The two indicators ‘Inflation’ and ‘Price control’ representing market-stabilizing 
institutions in the framework of Rodrik (see table 2) are both not significant. The correlation 
between the average GDP and the growth is rather strong. The correlations show an even 
more significant impact of institutions on the average GDP per capita. 
The overall Economic Freedom of the World variable (EFW) is, as expected, strongly 
and significantly related to many other variables representing the outcome of institutions. 
Shirley (2005: 614) states that: ‘In places where institutions increases the certainty that 
contracts will be honored and property protected, individuals will be more willing to 
specialize, invest in sunk assets, undertake complex transactions and accumulate and share 
knowledge’. Flower growing can be seen as highly specialized in developing countries. 
Flowers are highly perishable products and in most countries, there is no education or training 
for the production of high quality products for a domestic market. The transactions might 
therefore be seen as highly complex. It is quite remarkable that no empirical relation of the 
outcome of institution with the export market growth is found: all correlation coefficients are 
none significant and many have signs opposite to the expected. This suggests that the growth 
of this specific sector depends on different institutions. The strong and significant (p < 0.01) 
correlation between the plant property rights (UPOV years) and the average export level 
indicates such a specific relationship. 
 
 14 
Table 4 (Pearson) Correlation matrix of the selected variables (n=30) 
  Av. 
export 
Export 
growth 
Av. 
GDP 
GDP 
Growth  
km EFW Upov 
years 
IPR CPI CE Start Licens
e 
Edu Trade Infl Price Democ Un-
empl 
Av. Export 1                                   
Export growth 0.246 1                                 
Av. GDP  -0.046 -0.181 1                               
GDP growth -0.224 -0.145 0.715 1                          
Km -0.132 0.023 -0.174 -0.165 1                           
EFW -0.107 0.109 0.442 0.428 0.036 1                         
Upov years 0.481 0.297 0.383 0.102 0.070 0.193 1                       
IPR 0.067 0.022 0.429 0.289 0.159 0.181 0.299 1                     
CPI -0.172 -0.242 0.626 0.587 0.119 0.487 0.206 0.542 1                   
CE 0.047 -0.204 -0.031 -0.033 -0.248 -0.264 -0.274 -0.160 -0.141 1                 
Start -0.014 0.227 -0.383 -0.393 -0.209 -0.426 -0.046 -0.554 -0.671 0.345 1               
License -0.315 -0.201 -0.399 -0.253 -0.234 -0.502 -0.513 -0.333 -0.260 0.329 0.485 1             
Edu 0.160 -0.007 0.634 0.548 -0.098 0.318 0.422 0.414 0.343 -0.128 -0.185 -0.435 1           
Trade 0.263 0.176 -0.594 -0.597 0.067 -0.422 -0.161 0-.475 -0.508 0.041 0.310 0.141 -0.488 1         
Infl -0.017 -0.163 -0.052 -0.119 0.089 -0.385 -0.175 -0.070 -0.034 -0.156 -0.091 0.241 0.014 0.217 1       
Price 0.025 -0.016 0.370 0.202 0.128 0.563 0.376 -0.131 0.503 -0.079 -0.210 -0.308 0.19 -0.084 -0.058 1     
Democ 0.051 0.104 -0.472 -0.511 -0.189 -0.606 -0.187 -0.306 -0.460 -0.033 0.397 0.518 -0.415 0.250 0.127 -0.421 1   
Unempl 0.016 0.094 -0.496 -0.402 .485 -0.505 -0.184 -0.130 -0.270 -0.268 0.147 0.213 -0.371 0.631 0.499 -0.205 0.311 1 
 
Number: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Number: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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5. Discussion 
 
The growth in GDP per capita is strongly and significantly correlated to the outcome of 
institutions, but the export growth of cut flowers is not related at all to the quality of 
institutions (measured by the outcome of institutions). What might be the explanations for 
this? 
1. Flowers might be a special economic sector. In most developing countries, the domestic 
market is negligible. The sector depends fully on foreign markets and therefore only a 
selected group of entrepreneurs is involved. Producing flowers for the international 
market requires a strong international orientation and very specific agronomic 
knowledge. 
2. The flower growers in developing countries depend on foreign knowledge. The Israeli 
and Dutch are leading in the flower business. Mainly companies from these countries 
supply equipment, knowledge and marketing opportunities. It may be reasonable to 
expect that many institutional arrangements be strongly connected with the flow of 
goods and information. In Kenya about one third of the flower farms are managed by 
Dutch, one third by other nationalities and only one third by native Kenyan (van der 
Lans, 2005). Also in other countries the influence of the Dutch and Israeli is known, but 
has not been recorded into statistics. 
3. As far as we know flowers are not grown in economic free zones, but special 
arrangements are made. Several countries stimulate flower growing and exporting in 
order to reduce unemployment and to earn foreign currency. Cut flower export is in the 
top 5 export products of countries like Kenya and Ethiopia. Producing high value export 
products, such as flowers, supports the employment of many people: approximately 25 
employees per ha. Furthermore, the export value of 1 hectare roses is for instance USD 
150,000 which is equivalent to 1000 tons of wheat or to 600 to 700 ha wheat land in 
Ethiopia. 
4. Flowers are highly perishable products and transported by airfreight to the main 
consumer markets. Availability of sufficient air cargo capacity at competitive prices 
with a daily frequency is of high importance. While flowers fill the cargo space of 
outbound flights, other cargo has to be available for inbound flights. The Tanzanian 
flower sector for instance relies partly on Nairobi airport despite the presence of an 
international airport in the flower growing area. In this case, the air cargo capacity does 
not fit with the requirements of the flower exporters. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Instead of measuring institutions, which is quite difficult, we have measured the outcomes of 
institutions. Even with this simplification, it is hard to find comparable data for all countries. 
Simple macro-economic data like unemployment rates are not always available and official 
statistics differ compared to information from intelligence services such as Word 
Development Indicators and CIA-factbook. Another limitation of the data is that we measure 
the quality of (outcomes of) institutions at one moment, while we measure economic 
performance over a period of time. Ideally, we would have to measure institutions at two 
moments at a longer time interval (above 10 years), but we do not have sufficient information 
to do that.  
The growth of the GDP per capita is as expected positively correlated with the 
outcome of the quality of institutions. In this respect the selected developing flower growing 
countries do not differ with the mainstream results of other studies (Shirley, 2005, Jütting, 
2003). The two indicators ‘Inflation’ and ‘Price control’ representing market-stabilizing 
institutions in the framework of Rodrik (see table 2) are both not significant. The other three 
institutions from the framework of Rodrik show significant correlations. 
No evidence has been found that export growth of cut flowers is related to outcomes 
of institutions. We expect that the flower exporting industry is a special case that is rather 
unrelated to the rest of the economy. Due to the involvement of foreign knowledge, inputs 
and marketing the domestic institutions might be of less importance. The significant (p < 
0.01) correlation of the years of UPOV membership (International Union for Protection new 
plant varieties) with the level of flower exports supports this assumption. 
Future research may focus on sector specific institutions, like membership of UPOV, 
codes of Good Agricultural Practice (BRC, EurepGAP) or transport infrastructure. 
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Annex 1: Selected countries, flower exports and GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD. 
 Average 
export (1,000 
USD) in  
1995/1996 
Average 
export(1.000 
USD) in  
2004/2005 
Difference in 
export market 
share 
 95-05 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000 USD)   
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000 USD)   
 Growth GDP 
per capita 
(constant 
2000 US$)   
Bolivia 1090 34 -0.027 926 1034 108 
Brazil 1821 6506 0.073 3252 3564 312 
Cameroon 164 1973 0.032 525 662 137 
Chile 2723 4328 0.010 3946 5462 1516 
China 1037 27308 0.476 600 1323 723 
Colombia 562719 734633 -0.874 2012 2091 79 
Costa Rica 23779 31920 -0.021 3558 4328 770 
Côte d'Ivoire 2168 4227 0.022 579 574 -5 
Dominican Rep. 1788 2569 0.002 1712 2476 764 
Ecuador 123286 351705 3.318 1336 1459 123 
Egypt 457 1648 0.019 1235 1615 380 
Guatemala 10716 5697 -0.169 1554 1722 168 
India 6260 9894 0.022 350 538 188 
Indonesia 459 1890 0.023 774 906 132 
Kenya 107343 325621 3.246 413 427 14 
Malawi 3045 354 -0.071 124 153 29 
Malaysia 12204 45228 0.520 328 429 101 
Mauritius 6435 2819 -0.113 2955 4289 1334 
Mexico 20932 17217 -0.219 5309 5968 659 
Morocco 16355 3703 -0.350 1152 1349 197 
Peru 6453 6881 -0.038 1848 2206 358 
Poland 331 4750 0.079 3145 4890 1745 
South Africa 14079 25512 0.109 2934 3312 378 
Sri Lanka 565 1115 0.006 677 962 285 
Tanzania 5130 14901 0.143 239 313 74 
Thailand 73159 63154 -0.709 1906 2356 450 
Turkey 14348 22644 0.050 2527 3197 670 
Uganda 3841 27787 0.413 192 267 75 
Zambia 7279 17847 0.142 311 336 25 
Zimbabwe 54967 48548 -0.512 615 457 -158 
 
